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HAPPY BIRTHDAY:
CHARTER TURNS TWENTY FIVE
This year the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms turned 25 years old. Back on 
April 17, 1982 the Charter came into 
force and is part of Canada’s 
Constitution Act. It sets out rights and freedoms that 
Canadians believe are necessary in a free and 
democratic society. These rights include a number of 
legal rights that are enumerated in ss. 7-14. 
Often, these legal rights become the basis by which 
accused persons challenge the admissibility of 
evidence gathered by the police. Under s.24(2)  of the 
Charter a person may seek the exclusion of evidence 
if they can convince a court that evidence was 
obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any 
Charter rights and the admission of the evidence in 
the proceedings, having regard to all the 
circumstances,  would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. Furthermore, it is not 
unusual for accused persons to seek a remedy 
under s.24(1), such as having charges stayed 
or stopped because of police conduct.
Most cases where police conduct is 
questioned involve only a few of the legal 
rights under the Charter. These include ss.7-
10. 
• s.7  Everyone has the right to life, liberty 
and security of the person and the right 
not to be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. Rights such as the 
right to silence and full disclosure have 
been entrenched in s.7 by the courts. 
• s.8 Everyone has the right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure.
• s.9 Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained or imprisoned.
• s.10 Everyone has the right on arrest or detention 
a) to be informed promptly of the reasons 
therefor; b) to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay and to be informed of that right;  
It is important for police officers to have a working 
understanding of how these rights affect their jobs. 
In some recent judgments, courts have held that the 
police did not act in good faith because they should 
have known the law and the limits of their authority, 
while in other cases their legal training was 
inadequate. The comments of Justice Doherty in R. v. 
Clayton and Farmer are apposite, “If the rights 
guaranteed by the Charter are to have real meaning 
and shape the interaction between the police and 
individuals, police forces must take those rights 
seriously.  Officers must be trained to perform their 
duties in a manner that is consistent with those 
rights.”
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 ‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
“Glad to see the 
newsletter is alive and 
well; the website looks 
great too. Can’t tell you how helpful it 
has been during my short time out on 
the road. I have been a faithful reader and look 
forward to downloading issues and forwarding them to 
my squad.” - Police Constable, British Columbia
*********
“Could you please add me to the "In 
service 10-8" electronic distribution list.  
I sent out case law to our members to 
assist in the ever changing legal landscape. This would 
be a great asset.” - RCMP Sergeant, British Columbia 
*********
“Would you please add me to your 
distribution list? I really enjoy reading 
about the case laws, especially those 
pertaining to vehicle searches” - Police Constable, 
Manitoba
*********
“I have just had the opportunity to read 
one of the issues and would love to be 
added to the distribution list. They are 
informative and up to date, a great resource.” - 
Canada Border Services Agency Officer
*********
“I am now assigned to the new Station 
NCO position [and we] now have 24/7 
report quality control for all Crown 
Counsel reports. Members must attend our office for 
approval. We review the report in PRIME and either 
approve it or have them make the needed changes... 
Needless to say, it is quite a challenge, and a ton of 
work. Since none of us is an expert in all areas/
investigative nuances, we have been reviewing a ton of 
case law, and investigative techniques, etc. and 
thought we could really use your 10-8 publication. Be 
great to have 10-8 to help make decisions and guide 
the members.” - Police Sergeant, British Columbia
*********
“We always appreciate reading your 
newsletter-it is an excellent way to stay 
on top of the latest case law” - Federal 
Wildlife Officer
www.10-8.ca
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IN-SERVICE LEGAL ROAD TEST
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge your 
understanding of the law. 
Each question is based on a case featured in this issue. 
See page 24 for the answers.
1. Searches incidental to lawful arrest are an exception 
to the rule that all warrantless searches are prima 
facie unreasonable.
 (a) True
 (b) False
2. The mere fact a person broke and entered a place 
but did not commit an offence inside is sufficient to 
rebut the presumption found in the s.348(2)(a) of 
the Criminal Code that they entered with the intent 
to commit an indictable offence. 
 (a) True
 (b) False
3. When searching as an incident to lawful arrest, the 
police do not need separate reasonable grounds apart 
from arrest that the search will yield weapons or 
evidence of the offence.
 (a) True
 (b) False
4. Once an arrestee requests to speak to a lawyer, the 
police must refrain from eliciting incriminating 
evidence until the person has been provided a 
reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel.
 (a) True
 (b) False
5. A search incident to arrest will be unreasonable if 
evidence related to offences other than those for 
which the accused was arrested is discovered.
 (a) True
 (b) False
FIRST WOMAN SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICE DIES
The Honourable Bertha Wilson, 
formerly a justice of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, 
passed away in Ottawa on April 
28, 2007 after a prolonged 
illness. Justice Wilson attended 
the University of Aberdeen, 
Scotland, and graduated with an 
M.A. in 1944. She continued her 
education at the Training College 
for Teachers in Aberdeen, 
obtaining her diploma in 1945. 
She married the Reverend John Wilson in December 
1945 and they emigrated to Canada in 1949. In 1955, 
Bertha Wilson enrolled at Dalhousie University to study 
law, and in 1957 she completed her LL.B. and was called 
to the bar of Nova Scotia. In 1959 she was called to the 
bar of Ontario. She practised law in Toronto with 
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt for 17 years. 
Bertha Wilson broke ground in 1975 as the first woman 
appointed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, and again 
in 1982 when she became the first woman appointed to 
the Supreme Court of Canada. She retired from the 
Court in 1991.
Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, on behalf of the 
members of the Supreme Court of Canada, lamented 
Justice Wilson’s passing, “Bertha Wilson was known for 
her generosity of spirit and originality of thought. She 
was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada the 
same year the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms was enacted. As a member of this Court, she 
was a pioneer in Charter jurisprudence and made an 
outstanding contribution to the administration of 
justice. She will be sorely missed by all who were 
privileged to know her.”
Note-able Quote
“Confronted with the choice, the American people 
would choose the policeman's truncheon over the 
anarchist's bomb.” - Spiro T. Agnew
Source: Supreme Court of Canada News release
www.10-8.ca
LATIN LEGAL LINGO:
“de minimus (non curat lex)”- the law does not 
concern itself with trifles. Something that is unworthy 
of the law’s attention or does not rise to a level to be 
dealt with judicially. The matter is so trivial or 
technical no sentence or retribution is necessary. 
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SEARCHES INCIDENT TO 
ARREST ARE AN EXCEPTION TO 
WARRANTLESS PRESUMPTION
R. v. Alkins, 2007 ONCA 264
At about 1:00  a.m. two officers 
observed a vehicle registered to the 
accused’s father parked, but running, 
in the parking lot of an apartment 
building. The accused was in the driver’s seat and 
there were three other men in the vehicle.  The 
officers suspected that the occupants of the vehicle 
were committing liquor offences and were in 
possession of and smoking marijuana.
One officer approached the front passenger who 
was in breach of his probation order, which 
prohibited him from being in the area, while another 
officer approached the accused. The front 
passenger was arrested for failing to comply with his 
probation order and revealed that he had a large 
knife on his right side tucked into his pants when 
asked if he had any weapons. When searched, a gun 
was located in his front waistband and he was 
arrested for carrying a concealed weapon.   It was 
later determined that the gun was a pellet gun. 
Meanwhile, the other officer asked to see the 
accused’s driving documents and then told him to 
turn off the engine of the car.   After he learned 
that the front passenger had a weapon in his 
possession, the officer asked the accused to step 
out of the vehicle.  At that point, a handgun fell out 
of the accused’s pant leg.  He too was arrested for 
possession of a firearm, which also turned out to be 
a pellet gun.  The accused was patted down, but no 
other weapons were found.  
While the accused and front passenger were being 
arrested and searched, the two men in the back of 
the vehicle had been placing their hands underneath 
the seat and moving around suspiciously, so they 
were told to put their hands on their heads. They   
Back-up was called and were informed that two 
handguns had been located.   One of the backup 
officers opened the rear door on the passenger side 
to effect an arrest for possession of firearms in a 
motor vehicle.  He saw the passenger trying to kick 
a large knife under the seat in front of him.   The 
passenger was taken from the vehicle, arrested, 
POLICE EXEMPLARY SERVICE 
MEDAL
Most countries have, as part of their 
honours system, some form of official 
award to tangibly express national 
gratitude for long and commendable 
service, particularly in fields of 
endeavour involving potential risk. 
Canada’s Exemplary Service Medals 
recognize the men and women dedicated 
to preserving Canada’s public safety 
through long and outstanding service.
The Police Exemplary Service Medal, 
created on August 12, 1983, recognizes 
police officers who have served in an 
exemplary manner, characterized by 
good conduct, industry and efficiency. 
Recipients must have completed 20 years 
of full-time service with one or more recognized 
Canadian police forces. Full-time police cadets in 
training also qualify for the award. Consideration is 
given only to periods of service for which no other 
national long service, good conduct or efficiency 
decoration has been awarded. 
Members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) and Canadian Forces are ineligible. However, 
full-time exemplary service of former members of 
the RCMP and Military Police of the Canadian Forces 
may qualify where that service has not been 
recognized by award of the RCMP Long Service and 
Good Conduct Medal or the Canadian Forces 
Decoration, respectively. The Medal may be awarded 
posthumously.
Description: a circular medal:
• on the obverse of which are the Scales of 
Justice, superimposed on a stylized maple leaf, 
and circumscribed with Exemplary Service - 
Servces Distingues; 
• on the reverse of which is the Royal Cipher;
•  the Medal is suspended from a ribbon of five 
equal stripes, two gold and three blue; 
• a Bar, bearing a stylized maple leaf, may be 
awarded to a recipient of the Medal for each 
additional 10-year period of full-time service 
with one or more Canadian police forces. 
Source: http://www.gg.ca/honours/medals/hon04-esm_e.asp
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handcuffed and searched.  A second back up officer 
went to the rear door on the driver’s side and saw 
that passenger trying to conceal an item, which 
turned out to be another large knife.
Once all four occupants had been arrested and 
secured, the vehicle was searched and a large 
kitchen knife was located on the back seat, an 
Exacto knife on the floor behind the driver’s seat, 
and a large knife on the rear floor of the vehicle. In 
the trunk of the car a blue backpack was found and 
removed. The accused said, “Ah, shit.   Here we go.  
This should be interesting.”   Inside the backpack, 
the officer found a sawed-off shotgun with a shell 
chambered in the ready-to-fire position. When he 
was searched again at the police station, a knife with 
a three-inch blade was found hidden in his pants.
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
accused was charged with eight weapons related 
offences; two charges related to the knife and 
pellet gun and six charges related to the loaded 
sawed-off shotgun. The trial judge ruled the 
searches of the accused and the interior of the 
vehicle were lawful as an incident to arrest, but 
found the Crown did not prove the knife or pellet gun 
were “weapons” under s.2 of the Criminal Code. He 
also found the search of the trunk 
breached s.8 of the Charter. In his 
view, the accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the trunk 
and there was no reason why the 
search needed to be done immediately 
without a search warrant. Neither 
safety nor destruction of evidence 
were at issue because the car could 
have been detained while a search warrant was 
sought. The evidence obtained from the search of 
the trunk was excluded under s.24(2). The accused 
was acquitted on all eight counts. 
The Crown appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred by finding 
a s.8 Charter breach when police searched the trunk. 
Justice MacPherson, writing the unanimous decision 
of the Court, first examined the power to search as 
an incident to arrest:
Section  8 of the Charter protects against 
unreasonable search and seizure.   Searches 
conducted incident to arrest have been 
recognized as an exception to the rule that 
warrantless searches are prima facie 
unreasonable….  A search incident to arrest must 
still be reasonable within the meaning of s.  8….  
The search will be reasonable only if it is 
authorized by law, the law is reasonable, and the 
search is conducted in a reasonable manner.   A 
search conducted incident to arrest will be 
authorized by law if it meets the [following] 
requirements […] First, the arrest must be lawful.  
Second, the search must be truly incidental to 
arrest.  Third, the manner in which the search is 
conducted must be reasonable. [references 
omitted, para. 26]
Justice MacPherson concluded that the trial judge 
erred on two points; 1) the accused’s privacy interest 
in the trunk and 2) the absence of a supportable 
reason for the search. He wrote:
The privacy interest of the [accused] with 
respect to the car trunk was, in my view, 
miniscule.  The car was not the [accused’s]; 
it belonged to his father.   Moreover, there 
is “a lesser expectation of privacy in a car 
than there is in one’s home or office, or with 
respect to their physical person”….   The 
[accused] had been lawfully searched and a 
handgun (later determined to be a pellet gun) 
had been seized.  A passenger in the car had 
been arrested and a large 
knife and a handgun (also 
later determined to be a 
pellet gun) were seized from 
him.   More police arrived on 
the scene.  When [the backup 
officer] and his partner 
searched the interior of the 
car – a lawful search – two 
more large knives and an Exacto knife were 
discovered.   In these circumstances – four 
arrests, lawful searches of four persons and 
the interior of a car, and discovery and 
seizure of what appeared to be two handguns 
and four knives – it is difficult to see any 
serious privacy interest that the [accused] 
might have in the contents of the car trunk.  
The reality is that the car appeared to be 
filled with weapons and people connected to 
those weapons. [para. 40]
These same circumstances in Justice MacPherson’s 
opinion, provided a strong and supportable reason 
for the car trunk search:
“Searches conducted incident 
to arrest have been 
recognized as an exception to 
the rule that warrantless 
searches are prima facie 
unreasonable.”
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interior of the car.  In this respect, the search 
complied with [Chief Justice Lamer’s] stricture in 
Caslake…that “the search is only justifiable if the 
purpose of the search is related to the purpose 
of the arrest.”
It is true that the discovery of additional 
weapons in this case led to other weapons-related 
charges. … Additional charges flowing from a valid 
search are an appropriate result of the search.
In summary, I conclude that in the circumstances 
of this case, where multiple suspects have been 
lawfully arrested and several 
weapons have been discovered 
pursuant to lawful searches of 
the arrested persons and the 
interior of a car, it is 
appropriate for a police 
officer to search the trunk of 
the same car with a view to discovering additional 
weapons.   These weapons can be relevant to the 
weapons charges that have already been laid; they 
can also ground additional weapons-related 
charges. [citations omitted, paras. 42-48]
The search of the trunk was reasonable and the 
evidence was admissible. Furthermore, even if there 
was a Charter breach in this case, the evidence was 
admissible under s.24(2). The Crown’s appeal was 
allowed, the acquittals set aside, and a new trial was 
ordered.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Search Incident to Arrest
“[A search incident to arrest] must be for 
a valid objective in pursuit of the ends of 
criminal justice, such as the discovery of 
an object that may be a threat to the 
safety of the police, the accused or the 
public, or that may facilitate escape or act as evidence 
against the accused.  The purpose of the search must not 
be unrelated to the objectives of the proper administration 
of justice, which would be the case, for example, if the 
purpose of the search was to intimidate, ridicule or pressure 
the accused in order to obtain admissions.” - Supreme 
Court of Canada Justice L’Heureux-Dube, Cloutier v. 
Langlois (1990), 53 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.)
In my view, the search for more weapons was not 
only the natural thing to do; it was also fully 
compliant with s. 8 of the Charter.
When [the backup officer] arrived on the scene – 
a dark parking lot in the early morning hours of a 
wintry night – he faced “a very volatile situation 
in which it is fair for the police to expect the 
unexpected”….   [The backup officer] and his 
partner were responding to an emergency call for 
police back-up.   As soon as [the backup officer] 
arrived, he was informed that two men had been 
arrested and two handguns had been seized.  [The 
backup officer] approached the vehicle 
and saw two other men seated in the back 
of the car.  When he opened a rear door, 
he saw one of the men trying to kick a 
large knife under the seat.  He removed 
him from the car, brought him to the 
ground and handcuffed him.   Meanwhile, 
his partner was dealing with the other man in the 
back seat.  He discovered another large knife and 
an Exacto knife.
The purpose of s. 8 of the Charter is to protect 
against unreasonable searches.   In the 
circumstances I have outlined, [the backup 
officer’s] search of the car trunk for more 
weapons strikes me as the antithesis of an 
unreasonable search.
In Cloutier [the Supreme Court of Canada] 
observed that a search incident to arrest “must 
be for a valid objective in pursuit of the ends of 
criminal justice, such as the discovery of an 
object that may be a threat to the safety of the 
police, the accused or the public”.  In my view, this 
is precisely the situation in the present case.  
Where multiple weapons have been discovered on 
several arrested persons and in their vehicle, and 
where the arrests and searches leading to the 
discovery of the weapons are lawful, finishing the 
search of the same vehicle with a view to finding 
more weapons is the epitome of reasonable police 
conduct.   This can be contrasted with Belnavis 
where the search, conducted with a view to 
discovering stolen property, was unrelated to the 
arrest for traffic fines.
Moreover, the discovery of additional weapons 
would, potentially, be connected to a fair 
assessment of the nature and gravity of the 
weapons-related charges that the four men in the 
car were already facing.   It might shed light on 
the intended use to be made of the weapons 
already located on two of the accused and in the 
“Additional charges flowing 
from a valid search [incident 
to arrest] are an appropriate 
result of the search.”
www.10-8.ca
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committing an offence could amount to “evidence 
to the contrary” and thereby displaces the 
presumption.
We agree with the submission of the [Crown] that 
the purpose of the combination of the offence of 
breaking and entering with intent and the 
presumption created by s. 348(2)(a) is to deal 
precisely with the situation where the accused has 
broken and entered, yet committed no offence. 
 Here, the [accused] offers nothing more than the 
fact no offence was committed.  To say that that 
constitutes evidence to the contrary would be to 
ignore the presumption and essentially gut it of 
any meaning. [references omitted, paras. 5-7]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Police Decision Making
“[I]t is very easy in the cool, clear, light of 
day for this court to calmly and coolly 
analyze and make decisions about the 
actions of police officers who were 
making split second decisions in the heat 
of the moment.” - New Brunswick Provincial Court Judge 
McCarroll,  R. v. LeBlanc, 2006 NBPC 37
TRUNK & GLOVE BOX SEARCH 
JUSTIFIED AS INCIDENT TO 
ARREST
R. v. Shankar, 2007 ONCA 280
Two police officers on patrol saw a 
vehicle being driven at 2:29 am without 
its taillights on. The vehicle was pulled 
over and the accused was asked for his 
licence, registration, and insurance. He provided a 
licence but could not spell the name on it properly. 
He also produced a handwritten note and a 
photocopied registration. He gave an address of a 
possible crack house and fit the description of a 
crack dealer operating from there. The accused was 
subsequently arrested for attempting to mislead the 
police about his identity. They physically removed 
him from the car and he told police they were not 
allowed to search it. 
FACT NO OFFENCE COMMITTED 
INSUFFICIENT TO REBUT 
B&E PRESUMPTION
R. v. Rodney, 2007 ONCA 314         
The accused broke into an apartment, 
but left after about 30 seconds 
without committing an offence. At trial 
in the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice the judge rejected the accused’s 
explanation for being in the apartment. Although 
there was no evidence the accused had an intention 
to commit an indictable offence, the judge 
nonetheless entered a conviction for break and 
enter with intent to commit an indictable offence 
under s.348(1)(a) of the Criminal Code solely on the 
basis of the presumption of intent created by 
s.348(2)(a):
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing that leaving the apartment after 30 
seconds without committing an offence constituted 
“evidence to the contrary”, which was capable of 
displacing the statutory presumption. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal however, disagreed. 
The Court stated:
It is clear on the authorities that the point of 
entry is the time at which the accused’s intention 
is to be ascertained for the purpose of the 
offence of break and enter with intent under s. 
348(1)(a)… The application of the s.  348(2)(a) 
presumption at that point, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, supplies the proof of the 
requisite intent.
The proposition that the fact the accused did not 
commit an offence after entering the premises 
constitutes “evidence to the contrary” was 
rejected in R. v. Nicholas [and] R. v. Singh,….  While 
neither case is entirely on all fours with the case 
at bar, we are not persuaded in this case that the 
fact the accused left the apartment without 
s.348(2)(a) Criminal Code
For the purposes of proceedings under this section, 
evidence that an accused... broke and entered a place or 
attempted to break and enter a place is, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, proof that he broke and entered 
the place or attempted to do so, as the case may be, with 
intent to commit an indictable offence therein.
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However, the scope of the power is constrained by 
its source, the legal arrest.  The main purposes of 
search incident to arrest have been articulated by 
the Supreme Court of Canada as follows:
- to ensure the safety of the police and the public;
- to prevent the destruction of evidence; and,
- to discover evidence of the offence or offences 
for which the accused was arrested.
In order for a search to be incidental to an arrest, 
the police must have one or more of the valid 
purposes in mind when the search is conducted, 
and there must be some reasonable basis for the 
belief that the purpose will be served.  In Caslake, 
Chief Justice Lamer stressed that this is not a 
standard of reasonable and probable grounds but, 
rather, a common sense observation that an 
objective or purpose cannot be valid if it is not 
reasonable to pursue it in the 
circumstances.  In making this 
observation, the Chief Justice 
cautioned that “[t]he police 
have considerable leeway in the 
circumstances of an arrest 
which they do not have in other 
situations”... [citations 
omitted, paras. 11-12]
In this case there was no 
argument that the accused was 
lawfully arrested; the police 
subjectively believed they had 
grounds to arrest the accused 
and there was ample objective justification for the 
arrest. Further, “the search of the car flowed 
directly from the lawful arrest and was prompted by 
the nature and circumstances of the arrest.” In 
concluding that there was no s.8 breach,  Justice 
Gillese wrote:
Having lawfully arrested the [accused] for 
attempting to mislead the police, it was proper to 
check the car for documents pertaining to his true 
identity.   Furthermore, the circumstances of the 
arrest and taking the [accused] into custody gave 
rise to real concerns about safety, which made it 
appropriate to check the car for weapons.   The 
officer’s concern about public safety arose from 
the bullet-proof vests that the [accused] was 
wearing, the [accused’s] comments about people 
wanting to kill him, the time of night, and the fact 
that he believed that the [accused] was involved in 
the crack cocaine trade.  
When they patted him down they discovered he was 
wearing two bullet proof vests. He said he needed 
them because someone wanted to kill him. Police 
secured the accused in the back of a police car and 
searched the vehicle. In the trunk they found a 
semi-automatic pistol with a fully loaded 30 round 
clip and in the locked glove box they found a hunting 
knife and a fully loaded nine-shot revolver in a 
shoulder holster.
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
police said they had two purposes in searching the 
car: 1) to find documentation relating to the 
accused’s true identity and 2) for public safety (to 
search for weapons). The trial judge concluded the 
officers could have obtained a search warrant 
quickly without creating safety issues. In his view, 
the extended search of the vehicle 
was not reasonably necessary in 
the circumstances and breached 
the accused’s s.8 Charter rights. 
However, he found the officers 
acted in good faith throughout the 
encounter and admitted the guns 
into evidence under s.24(2). The 
accused was convicted of two 
counts of possessing a loaded 
firearm, possessing a prohibited 
device, driving while disqualified, 
and public mischief. 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing the guns should have been excluded 
as evidence because the police did not act in good 
faith; they were ignorant of the scope of their 
powers. This increased the seriousness of the 
Charter breach and the admission of the firearms 
would bring the administration into disrepute. The 
Crown, on the other hand, asked the appeal court to 
reconsider the s.8 issue, arguing the search was 
proper as an incident to arrest. 
Justice Gillese, writing the opinion of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, first reviewed the power of search 
incident to arrest. She stated:
The common law power to search incident to 
arrest endures under the Charter.   The power 
flows from a legal arrest, and there need not be 
separate reasonable and probable grounds that 
the search will yield evidence or weapons.  
“The common law power to 
search incident to arrest endures 
under the Charter.  The power 
flows from a legal arrest, and 
there need not be separate 
reasonable and probable grounds 
that the search will yield evidence 
or weapons.  However, the scope 
of the power is constrained by its 
source, the legal arrest.” 
www.10-8.ca
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PROVIDING S.10(b) RIGHTS 
PARTWAY THROUGH INTERVIEW 
PROCESS DID NOT FIX BREACH
R. v. Lewis, 2007 ONCA 349
The accused was arrested as he was 
leaving his apartment for the vicious 
attack of two young men. He was 
advised of his right to counsel and 
immediately told the arresting officer he wanted to 
talk to his lawyer. The officer told him he could do 
so at the police station. The accused was 
transported to the police station and again advised 
of his right to counsel. Although he did not make a 
second request to speak to a lawyer, he was not 
provided with the opportunity to do so in response to 
his earlier request. 
The accused was placed in an interview room and 
searched. The lead investigator in the case 
questioned him for 20 minutes, between 4:05 pm and 
4:25 pm. The accused initially denied being present 
at the crime scene but then admitted to being in a 
fight without weapons. He also agreed to a photo-
lineup to identify an outstanding suspect and to 
being recorded while doing so. No recording of the 
interview was made. The accused then repeated his 
request to speak to a lawyer, which was provided. 
After speaking to duty counsel the accused 
participated in the videod photo-lineup and then 
made a statement which was audiotaped. He 
admitted he was at the scene and punched one 
victim. 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
judge admitted the statements following the 
accused’s arrest that were video and audiotaped.  
The jury convicted the accused of two counts of 
attempted murder and two counts of robbery. He 
was sentenced to seven years in prison after being 
credited three years for pre-trial custody. 
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the two recorded 
statements were taken in violation of his s.10(b) 
Charter right to counsel. He submitted that both 
statements taken after he spoke to his lawyer were 
part of a process that began with the interview that 
proceeded his access to counsel. In the accused’s 
While a fairly extensive search of the vehicle was 
conducted in this case, in my view, it was reasonable 
in the circumstances.  Those circumstances… include 
the following:
• The search followed a determination by [the 
officer] that it was merited in order to locate 
weapons and/or discover evidence as to the 
[accused’s] true identity.
• It was conducted pursuant to valid state 
objectives, i.e. public protection and the discovery 
and preservation of evidence which could be 
located at the scene of the arrest, and not for any 
oblique or improper motive.
• The search was relatively non-intrusive.  It began 
with an inspection of the interior of the car, under 
the seats, and proceeded logically from there to 
the trunk and the glove box.
• There is a diminished expectation of privacy in a 
motor vehicle.
• There was nothing abusive in the manner in which 
the search was conducted.  No damage was done 
to the car, no individuals were interfered with, 
and the seizures were selective and related to the 
purpose of the search.
• Immediately upon finding the first gun, the 
Emergency Task Force was called so as to properly 
secure the guns and make them safe. [paras. 15-16]
Furthermore, even if there was a breach of s.8, the 
evidence was admissible under s.24(2). The officers 
acted in good faith; they reasonably believed they 
were entitled to search the car.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Dangerous Driving: Falling Asleep
“[A] sleeping driver is in a state of non-
insane automatism and cannot be convicted 
of dangerous driving on the basis of acts of 
driving committed while in that state, since 
such acts are involuntary and cannot form 
the actus reus of the offence.  However, such a driver may 
be convicted of dangerous driving if the trier of fact is satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver embarked on 
driving or continued to drive in circumstances in which he 
knew or ought to have known that it was dangerous to do so 
because there was a real risk that he would fall asleep at the 
wheel.” - British Columbia Court of Appeal Justice Smith,  R. 
v. Jiang, 2007 BCCA 270
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view, the statements should have 
been excluded under s.24(2). The 
Crown, on the other hand, contended 
that the two statements admitted 
into evidence by the trial judge were 
provided to police after the accused 
had spoken to a lawyer. 
Justice Goudge, authoring the 
unanimous judgment for the Ontario 
Court of Appeal agreed with the 
accused. He stated:
[T]here can be no doubt that the inculpatory 
statements made by the [accused] to the police 
between 4:05 p.m. and 4:25 p.m. were taken in 
violation of his s. 10(b) rights. He had already 
expressed his wish to exercise his right to consult 
a lawyer but had not been given an opportunity to 
do so. Once he made this request the police were 
obliged to refrain from eliciting incriminating 
evidence from him until he was afforded that 
opportunity.
The Crown relies on the fact that the two 
statements admitted into evidence, the video 
statement and the audio recording, were given 
after the [accused] subsequently spoke to 
counsel…
In my view, this does not immunize them from the 
earlier Charter breach…
In this case there was a close temporal connection 
between the taking of the original statement 
between 4:05 p.m. and 4:25 p.m. in breach of the 
[accused’s] s. 10(b) rights, and the taking of the 
two recorded statements that were concluded less 
than three hours later. Moreover, the three 
statements were all part of the same 
interrogation process. The [accused] remained in 
the custody of the same police officers during 
that time and their objective throughout was to 
obtain statements from the [accused]. The 
inculpatory audio recording is essentially a repeat 
of the first statement made by the [accused] 
prior to obtaining legal advice. The police made no 
attempt to sever any connection between these 
two…“The  absence of any attempt by the police to 
make a ‘fresh start’ after the [accused] had 
spoken with counsel further cements   the 
connection” between the statements. 
I would therefore conclude that the video 
statement and the audio recording were obtained 
in a manner that infringed the 
[accused’s] right to counsel. 
[references omitted, paras. 29-33]
As for whether the evidence was 
inadmissible under s.24(2), Justice 
Goudge concluded the statements 
were conscriptive, the s.10(b) 
breach serious, and the admission 
of the statements would undermine 
the fairness of the trial and bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute. The 
accused’s appeal was allowed, his conviction quashed, 
and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
s.24(2) Charter: “Obtained in a Manner”
“The evidence will be “obtained in a 
manner” that infringed a Charter right if on 
a review of the entire course of events, 
the breach and the obtaining of the 
evidence can be said to be part of the 
same transaction or course of conduct.  The connection 
between the breach and the obtaining of the evidence may 
be temporal, contextual, causal or a combination of the 
three.  The connection must be more than tenuous.” - 
Ontario Court of Appeal Justice Doherty, R. v. Plaha, (2004) 
Docket: C35157 (OntCA)
INCIDENTAL SEARCH NOT 
UNREASONABLE BECAUSE 
UNRELATED EVIDENCE FOUND
R. v. Duong, 2007 BCCA 227
The accused was pulled over in his van 
after he attempted to solicit the 
sexual services of an undercover 
police officer posing as a sex trade 
worker. He was arrested for communication for the 
purpose of prostitution and searched. Police found a 
wallet with a driver’s licence, two cellular 
telephones, a small calculator, and some keys. His van 
was also searched and a white plastic shopping bag 
containing $5,700 in cocaine and $15,000 cash was 
found on the driver’s side floor. A gift bag found 
“Once [the accused] 
made this request [to 
speak to a lawyer] the 
police were obliged to 
refrain from eliciting 
incriminating evidence 
from him until he was 
afforded that opportunity.”
www.10-8.ca
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area notorious for the sex trade,” said Justice 
Kirkpatrick. “The numerous types of unlawful 
behaviour connected with the sex trade warranted 
care in the search of the [accused] and his van.” She 
continued:
Furthermore, in my opinion, the trial judge did not 
err in his conclusion that the search of the 
[accused] and the van he was driving fell within the 
permissible limits articulated in Caslake.  As [the 
officer] explained in his evidence, persons 
arrested for this offence often carry multiple 
sets of identification which may require further 
investigation as to the true identity of the 
arrested person.  In addition, I 
consider that there was a 
reasonable basis for [the 
officer’s] search.  It is true that 
he did not have specific 
knowledge that the [accused] 
was known to carry weapons, or 
that anyone had been abducted 
in the area, or that the 
[accused] or the van had been 
involved in any unlawful conduct.  
However, that is not the test.  
The test, as stated in Caslake… 
is whether there is "some 
reasonable basis for doing what the police officer 
did”.
In my opinion, the occurrence of a limited police 
search of the arrested individual and his vehicle, 
in furtherance of the stated objectives in 
Caslake - officer safety, preservation of evidence, 
and discovery of evidence - was supported by [the 
officer’s] evidence and the other evidence 
tendered on the voir dire.  [The officer’s] search 
incidental to arrest, which was for a validly 
articulated purpose such as safety of the public or 
the police, did not become unreasonable by virtue 
of the discovery of evidence relating to offences 
other than those for which the [accused] was 
being investigated... [paras. 26-27]
Even if the search breached s.8 exclusion of the 
evidence would not have been warranted under 
s.24(2) of the Charter, Justice Kirkpatrick ruled. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
near the driver’s seat contained a kilogram of 
cocaine valued at $25,000. The accused was then 
arrested for possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused conceded he was lawfully arrested but 
argued the police were only allowed to pat him down 
and were not allowed to search his pockets or the 
van. The officer said he conducted a cursory search 
of the van, looking for items that could comprise a 
“sex assault kit”, such as duct tape, zap straps, and 
weapons to assault or kidnap sex trade workers. The 
trial judge ruled that the 
search was reasonable even 
though there was no reason to 
suspect the accused might 
possess items that could be 
used to harm sex trade 
workers. He held that assaults 
on sex trade workers by 
customers are serious and 
relatively common and that a 
search around the driver’s seat 
of a vehicle driven by a person 
arrested for communication for 
the purpose was lawful and reasonable when the 
search was undertaken to look for weapons. The 
evidence was admitted and the accused was 
convicted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking.
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal arguing, in part, that the police had no 
justification in searching either his person or the 
van. He submitted that the officer did not have the 
necessary subjective or objective grounds to 
reasonably believe there were weapons, escape aids, 
or a rape kit in the van or that the accused was 
connected to assaults or kidnappings of sex trade 
workers. Therefore, in his view, the searches were 
not truly incidental to arrest and were unreasonable 
under s.8 of the Charter. 
Justice Kirkpatrick, authoring the unanimous 
judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
upheld the accused’s conviction. The officer had a 
valid reason related to the arrest for conducting the 
searches. The accused “was lawfully arrested in an 
“[The officer’s] search incidental to 
arrest, which was for a validly 
articulated purpose such as safety of 
the public or the police, did not 
become unreasonable by virtue of 
the discovery of evidence relating to 
offences other than those for which 
the [accused] was being 
investigated.”
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LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Search Incident to Arrest
“In summary, searches must be authorized 
by law. If the law on which the Crown is 
relying for authorization is the common 
law doctrine of search incident to arrest, 
then the limits of this doctrine must be 
respected. The most important of these limits is that the 
search must be truly incidental to the arrest. This means 
that the police must be able to explain, within the [following] 
purposes … (protecting the police, protecting the evidence, 
discovering evidence), or by reference to some other valid 
purpose, why they searched. They do not need reasonable 
and probable grounds. However, they must have had some 
reason related to the arrest for conducting the search at the 
time the search was carried out, and that reason must be 
objectively reasonable.  Delay and distance do not 
automatically preclude a search from being incidental to 
arrest, but they may cause the court to draw a negative 
inference.  However, that inference may be rebutted by a 
proper explanation.” - Supreme Court of Canada Chief 
Justice Lamer, R. v. Caslake, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51.
“CHOKE UNDER PRESSURE?”
Insp. Kelly Keith, Atlantic Police Academy
Why is it that some athletes 
choke under pressure while 
others seem to get better?  
What was it that made Michael 
Jordan better in the last 
minutes of the game?
There is far more money put into sports research 
than law enforcement research. However, we can 
learn plenty of valuable lessons from tapping into 
this resource.  Just as some athletes choke when the 
pressure of the game is high, law enforcement 
officers also have this same issue.  There are many 
factors that can contribute to this, but lets take a 
look at this issue from a sports perspective and 
relate it to law enforcement.  
Sporting competition promotes psychological and 
bodily responses similar to the “fight or flight” 
response.  If the event is beyond one’s perceived 
ability, anxiety is the inevitable outcome.
Stress can be viewed as positive or negative.  We all 
know people who fight stronger when more stress is 
added while others fold or buckle under the 
pressure.  If we simply understand that the “fight 
or flight” body reactions are the body preparing to 
do well , it assists us in viewing it as a positive.  
Generally, the higher the level of competition,  
stress and anxiety increases; individual 
performances tend to be more stressful and bring 
out greater anxiety. Both in sports and law 
enforcement the greater the chance of getting hurt, 
the greater the anxiety. As well, anxiety is also 
increased if the expectation of success is high.
Anxiety can be recognized on the cognitive level  (by 
particular thought processes), the somatic level (by 
physical responses) and/or on the behavioural level 
(by certain patterns of behaviour). 
If you believe in yourself and have positive 
expectations of success, you will be more confident 
and subsequently you are likely to perform close to 
your best. If you do not believe in your abilities or  
are not confident in your success, your performance 
will suffer.  
It is believed that if athletes set their own goals 
rather than have goals imposed upon them by a coach 
or team manager, their confidence will increase and 
their anxiety will be reduced. The perceived support 
of a coach can assist the athlete in better coping 
with the psychological demands of competition. In 
order to reduce anxiety it is better for the coach to 
encourage athletes to beat their own performance 
rather than seek superiority over their peers.  
We all have body responses to stress and anxiety. If 
you can recognize your own responses to stress and 
anxiety, it will assist you in properly handling them.  
Once you recognize your body responses you can 
start to take action against stress and anxiety by:  
1. Remember your “winning feeling” and link your 
emotions to this feeling.  Before your next 
competition, put yourself into this state of 
emotion and concentrate on the “winning feeling”;
2. Combat breathe, combat breathe and combat 
breathe some more!  Empty all the air in your 
lungs, replacing bad air with the good.  Do this 
multiple times; and
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3. When you start feeling a negative or unwanted 
thought (cognitive anxiety) such as “I just don’t 
want to be here today”, picture a large red stop 
sign in your mind’s eye or change the channel in 
your head.  You can then follow this with a 
positive self-statement such as “I am going to 
hit it hard right from the off!” Thought-
stopping can be used to block an unwanted 
thought before it escalates or disrupts 
performance. The technique can help to create a 
sharp refocus of attention keeping you 
engrossed in the task at hand.
It is normal to experience stress and anxiety in any 
competition. What separates those that are 
successful from those that are not is how they 
handle it.  Don’t allow stress and anxiety to make you 
“choke” under pressure! 
Reference: Peak Performance e-newsletter.
ROAD RULES:
High Occupancy Vehicle Lanes
Division 42 of BC’s Motor Vehicle Act 
Regulations outlines the rules with respect 
to High Occupancy Vehicles. Section 
42.03(2) states that “A driver of a vehicle 
that is not a high occupancy vehicle must 
not use a high occupancy vehicle lane on 
a freeway.” A “high occupancy vehicle”  is a bus or a 
vehicle under 5,500 kg GVW that is carrying the minimum 
number of persons specified for that lane. Of course, like 
most legislation, there are exceptions to the rules. The 
following drivers may drive in a high occupancy lane without 
the minimum number of persons required:
• Emergency vehicles
• Peace officers on active duty
• Motorcycles, taxis, handy dart vehicles
• Marked vehicles responding to a disabled vehicle or 
another emergency on the freeway (eg. tow truck)
Note-able Quote
“The young man knows the rules, but the old man 
knows the exceptions.” - Oliver Wendell Holmes 
COURT MUST KNIT EVIDENCE 
TOGETHER AS A WHOLE WHEN 
ASSESSING  GROUNDS
R. v. Todd, BCCA 176
A police officer found the accused 
asleep in his car that was stopped at a 
green traffic light with the engine 
running, the car in gear, and loud music 
playing.   After the officer pounded on the driver’s 
window at least four times, the accused rolled down 
the window, releasing a smell of alcohol.  The accused 
produced a “Save On More” card when asked for his 
driver’s licence and the officer observed that he had 
“glassy eyes”. A breath demand was made, 
appropriate warnings given, and the accused was  
arrested. At the police station, the arresting officer 
again observed the accused’s eyes were glassy, 
detected a strong odour of alcohol coming from his 
breath, noted he was a little unsteady on his feet, 
and saw that his face was flushed slightly. The 
accused provided two breath samples and was 
charged with impaired and over 80mg%.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused was acquitted. The trial judge, in part, ruled 
that the officer did not have objectively reasonable 
and probable grounds for the breath demand. He 
looked at individual indicia of impairment and found 
a possible alternative explanation for each:
• Pounding on the window four times to awake the 
accused-the music could have been so loud that 
the person inside (awake or asleep) may have 
thought “the bass was a little heavy on the music”;
• Production of the “Save on More Card”-the 
person merely produced the wrong card; there 
was no evidence of fumbling the card or staring 
at it intently before handing it over;
• Glassy eyes-the driver could have been driving 
for a long time or could have been crying from a 
recent emotional experience; and
• The officer never made any inquiries of the 
driver as to why he fell asleep or ask any 
questions about liquor consumption. 
The Crown appealed to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that the trial 
judge erred in concluding the officer did not have 
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WARRANTLESS WEAPONS 
SEARCH: SAFETY SHOULD NOT 
DEPEND ON GUESSWORK
R. v. Peacock-McDonald, 2007 ONCA 128
Two police officers attended at the 
accused’s residence in response to her 
complaint concerning noise from her 
neighbours.  As a result of talking with 
and observing her, the officers concluded that she 
was suicidal.  Accordingly, they took her to the 
hospital for an evaluation by a physician as to 
whether she should be detained under s.15 of 
Ontario’s Mental Health Act (MHA) for a psychiatric 
assessment.
Within ten minutes of their arrival at the hospital, 
one of the police officers obtained a firearms 
licence that was in the accused’s possession, 
together with the keys to her house and her 
firearms’ cabinet.  The officer then left the hospital 
to return to search the accused’s home for her 
firearms.  The police officer staying at the hospital 
was informed at about the same time that the 
attending physician intended to sign an involuntary 
admission form under the MHA requiring the 
accused’s detention for the purpose of a psychiatric 
examination.  The officer returning to the accused’s 
home was not told of this decision before he left the 
hospital.
The officer attended and entered the accused’s 
residence without a warrant to search for her 
firearms, relying on s.117.04(2) of the Criminal 
Code.  He seized seven firearms in total, all of which 
were registered and properly stored by her at the 
time of the seizure.  The officer then returned to 
the hospital where he learned of the MHA 
authorization for the accused’s detention. She was 
transported to a psychiatric facility for an 
evaluation, arriving about three hours after the 
search of her home.  She was subsequently released 
less than forty-eight hours later.
The police applied under s.117.05(1) of the Criminal 
Code for a hearing concerning the forfeiture of the 
seized firearms. The accused, however, argued the 
requirements of s.117.04(2) had not been met and 
therefore the warrantless search was not justified. 
objectively reasonable and probable grounds for the 
breath demand. The appeal court judge agreed with 
the Crown and ordered a new trial. In his view, the 
trial judge erred in considering alternative 
explanations for  the indicia of impairment that were 
not in evidence and that “individual pieces of 
evidence must not be examined in isolation but must 
be considered in the context of the totality of the 
evidence.” 
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal submitting that the appeal court 
judge erred in allowing the appeal. Justice Chiasson, 
rendering the decision of the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal, agreed with the appeal judge’s findings. 
He found that the trial judge erred in reviewing and 
discounting each indicia of impairment observed by 
the officer. The proper test is to look at the 
evidence as a whole, not each piece by itself and 
speculate on other possibilities. 
Justice Saunders also commented on the trial 
judge’s piecemeal approach. She said:
[T]he trial judge addressed specific components 
of the evidence, but does not appear to have 
stepped back after, to knit it together as a whole.  
Had he done so, the whole necessarily would have 
included reference to the feature of the 
undisputed evidence, which was the observed 
odour of alcohol emanating from the car when the 
window was rolled down, that was not referred to 
either in the ruling on the reasonable and probable 
cause for the demand and the subsequent 
exclusion of the breathalyzer test results, or in 
the reasons for acquittal on the impaired driving 
charge. 
On the issue of conjecture, the trial judge also 
engaged in out-loud wondering, creating 
explanations for the officer’s observations that 
had no foundation in the evidence tendered.  
There was, for example, no evidence that [the 
accused] had been driving for 10 hours or just had 
an emotional experience that made his eyes 
glassy.   Yet the trial judge proffered these as 
potential explanations for that observation in his 
ruling on the breathalyzer demand issue.  [paras. 
36-37]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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She claimed the application judge therefore lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the forfeiture matter. She also 
submitted that the search was unreasonable and 
violated her rights under s.8 of the Charter. 
In the Ontario Court of Justice the application 
judge held the conditions to invoke s.117.04(2) of 
the Criminal Code had been satisfied and no breach 
of s.8 had occurred. Since the search was lawful, he 
had jurisdiction to proceed with the forfeiture 
hearing. The application judge granted forfeiture 
and gave the accused 30 days to transfer ownership 
of the firearms or they would be forfeited to the 
Crown. 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice and the search was found to have violated 
the accused’s rights under s.8 of the Charter 
because she had been detained under the MHA for 
at least 72 hours observation which would have 
abated her being a danger to herself or anyone else. 
However, the appeal judge found the evidence of the 
firearms admissible under s.24(2) and ruled the 
application judge had jurisdiction to conduct the 
forfeiture order and dismissed the appeal. 
The accused again appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing the appeal judge erred in holding the 
application judge had jurisdiction to hear the matter 
and that the test for forfeiture under s.117.05(1) 
had been met. In her view, a s.117.05 forfeiture 
hearing may only be conducted where the firearms 
in question were validly seized with or without 
warrant under s.117.04. She submitted, in part, that 
the preconditions for a warrantless search under 
s.117.04(2) were not met and the firearms 
therefore, were not validly seized under that 
section. 
Although warrantless searches are presumptively 
unreasonable under s.8 of the Charter, s.117.04(2) 
authorizes a search and seizure for weapons without 
the need for a warrant if there are reasonable 
grounds to believe it is not desirable in the interests 
of safety for a person to possess a weapon and there 
are grounds to get a warrant, but it is impracticable 
to obtain the warrant because of a possible danger 
to safety. 
Justice Cronk, writing the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, concluded it was impracticable in the 
circumstances for the police to obtain a warrant 
BY THE BOOK:
s.117.04 (1) Criminal Code
Where, pursuant to an application made by a 
peace officer with respect to any person, a justice 
is satisfied by information on oath that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
possesses a weapon…and that it is not desirable 
in the interests of the safety of the person, or of 
any other person, for the person to possess the 
weapon…the justice may issue a warrant 
authorizing a peace officer to search…and seize 
any such thing, and any authorization, licence or 
registration certificate relating to any such thing, 
that is held by or in the possession of the person.
S.117.04(2) Criminal Code 
Where, with respect to any person, a peace officer 
is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that it is not desirable, in the interests of 
the safety of the person or any other person, for 
the person to possess any weapon…the peace 
officer may, where the grounds for obtaining a 
warrant under subsection (1) exist but, by reason 
of a possible danger to the safety of that person 
or any other person, it would not be practicable to 
obtain a warrant, search for and seize any such 
thing, and any authorization, licence or 
registration certificate relating to any such thing, 
that is held by or in the possession of the person.
s.117.05(1) Criminal Code
Where any thing or document has been seized 
under subsection 117.04(1) or (2), the justice who 
issued the warrant authorizing the seizure or, if no 
warrant was issued, a justice who might otherwise 
have issued a warrant, shall, on application for an 
order for the disposition of the thing or document 
so seized made by a peace officer within thirty 
days after the date of execution of the warrant or 
of the seizure without a warrant, as the case may 
be, fix a date for the hearing of the application and 
direct that notice of the hearing be given to such 
persons or in such manner as the justice may 
specify.
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Section 15(5) of the MHA authorizes the 
detention of a person in a psychiatric facility 
under a Form 1 signed by a physician for a period 
“not more than 72 hours”.   Thus, the appellant’s 
detention was not for a period of “at least” 
seventy-two hours.  To the contrary, the length of 
her detention was uncertain.  She could have been 
released within minutes or hours of her initial 
detention at the hospital.   This possibility 
ultimately materialized when the appellant was 
released from the hospital in less than forty-eight 
hours.
Second, the detention of the appellant pursuant 
to the MHA did not have the effect of “abating” 
or “negating” the possibility of the appellant being 
a danger to herself or others for a period of 
seventy-two hours.  As I have said, the appellant 
could have been released from the hospital at any 
time after her initial detention under a Form 1.  In 
this important sense, therefore, a possible danger 
to the appellant’s safety and to the public 
persisted when [the officer] conducted the 
search.
Moreover, nothing on this record suggests that 
there was any realistic opportunity for the police 
to obtain a warrant in the time that elapsed 
between the appellant’s arrival at the hospital and 
the completion of the search 
carried out by [the officer].   The 
Officer testified that the time 
required to obtain a search 
warrant for a residence could vary 
from “as little as four or five hours 
to two days or more sometimes of 
trying to confirm your 
grounds…and articulate it”.  He also said that he 
did not know for sure whether the appellant was 
going to be assessed until he got back to the 
hospital after seizing her firearms and that, if 
she were released, it would be too late to seize 
them.
In my view, when public safety issues are 
implicated, as in this case, the police should not be 
required to speculate upon the timing of the 
release from hospital of a person in the appellant’s 
position in the hope that they might secure a 
warrant for the seizure of firearms in the 
possession of the detainee before that release.  
Matters of public safety, when firearms are 
involved, should not depend on guesswork; nor are 
they a ‘race to the swiftest’. [paras. 26-29]
before searching for the accused’s firearms. She 
stated:
The appellant submits that once she was detained 
under the MHA, any “possible danger” to herself 
or others was negated because one of two events 
would then occur.  First, she could be admitted to 
a psychiatric facility under the authority of a 
Form 1, thus removing the possibility of any 
immediate danger to herself or any other person 
arising from her possession of the firearms.  
Alternatively, she could be released following her 
examination by a physician, thereby establishing 
that she was not a danger to herself or others.  
In either event, two requirements for a 
warrantless search under s. 117.04(2) – a possible 
danger arising from the appellant’s possession of 
the firearms and the impracticability of obtaining 
a warrant – would not be met.  In this case, the 
first scenario applied, that is, the examining 
physician signed a Form 1 for the appellant’s 
detention.   The appellant therefore argues that 
the police officers had sufficient time to obtain a 
warrant, no immediate possible danger arose from 
her possession of the firearms, and s. 117.04(2) of 
the Code could not be invoked to justify a 
warrantless search.
I disagree.   The appellant…was 
suicidal when the police took her to 
the hospital for an examination.  The 
application judge accepted [the 
officer’s] testimony that when they 
arrived at the hospital, [the officer] 
was concerned that the appellant 
would “shore herself up” and deny 
that she was suicidal, causing the 
hospital to release her.   The application judge 
found that [the officer] had “a specific concern” 
for the appellant’s safety because she was a high 
suicide risk and, further, that he had “a concern 
for the general public” because the appellant had 
firearms at her residence and it was uncertain 
whether she would be detained for a psychiatric 
assessment. [para. 20-21]
Justice Cronk also considered the ruling of the 
appeal judge that the accused’s s.8 Charter rights 
had been violated because of the apparent 72 hour 
MHA detention. She found this reasoning to be 
flawed in two ways:
First, a Form 1 authorization for the detention of 
a person under the MHA is not a detention “for at 
least 72 hours of observation” by a physician.  
“Matters of public safety, when 
firearms are involved, should 
not depend on guesswork; nor 
are they a ‘race to the 
swiftest’.”
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And further:
The evidence before the application judge clearly 
demonstrated that, at the time of the search, 
the appellant’s continued possession of the 
firearms posed a possible danger to herself and 
to others.   The imminence of this existing 
possible danger was not diminished by the fact of 
her initial detention for medical examination 
under the authority of s. 15 of the MHA.  Because 
the length of the appellant’s detention under the 
MHA was uncertain, I am not persuaded that it 
was practicable, having regard to public safety 
and the safety of the appellant, for [the officer] 
to first seek a warrant before conducting a 
search of the appellant’s residence. [para. 32]
The preconditions for a lawful search under 
s.117.04(2) had been satisfied and there was no s.8 
Charter breach. The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Reasonable Grounds: Breath Demand
“[The arresting officer’s demand for breath 
samples at the roadside based on 
reasonable grounds] was a continuing 
demand that remained in force until 
complied with. The fact that there was a 
subsequent demand made by the breathalyzer technician 
without reasonable and probable grounds and that the 
[accused] refused that demand does not invalidate the 
earlier demand nor change the character of the [accused’s] 
ongoing refusal to comply. Section 254(3) of the Criminal 
Code does not require multiple demands. Moreover, in our 
view, the subsequent demand was no more than a good 
faith attempt by the breathalyzer technician to give the 
[accused] a further opportunity to comply.” - Ontario Court 
of Appeal, R. v. Townsend, 2007 ONCA 332
Note-able Quote
“I wanted you to see what real courage is, instead 
of getting the idea that courage is a man with a gun 
in his hand. It's when you know you're licked before 
you begin but you begin anyway and you see it 
through no matter what.” -  Harper Lee
BOLF:
UPCOMING SUPREME COURT OF 
CANADA JUDGMENTS
There are a number of Supreme 
Court of Canada decisions that 
police officers should keep a look 
out for. 
Dog Sniff
R. v. Brown (Alberta Court of Appeal—as of right) 
Police officers were patrolling a bus terminal as part 
of an operation involving investigators monitoring 
the traveling public in order to identify and arrest 
drug couriers, among others. The team was watching 
passengers disembark from an over-night bus. One 
officer noticed the accused and monitored his 
movements. In the foyer of the bus terminal, the 
officer started a conversation with the accused and 
identified himself as a police officer. The officer 
called to the police dog and she made an immediate 
passive indication of the presence of drugs. The 
accused was charged with possession of cocaine for 
the purposes of trafficking and possession of heroin. 
The accused alleged at trial that his s. 9 Charter 
rights were breached when the police held a 
conversation with him in the foyer of the bus depot 
and that his s. 8 Charter rights were breached when, 
during the course of that conversation, a sniffer dog 
was used to detect drugs.
The trial judge and the majority of the Alberta 
Court of Appeal held that the accused was neither 
arbitrarily detained nor unlawfully searched. The 
majority dismissed his appeal. Relying partly on the 
Supreme Court of Canada ruling in R. v. Tessling the 
majority concluded that there was no "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" in relation to the odours 
emanating into the public sphere from the accused’s 
bag. Justice Paperny, in dissent, concluded that 
while the accused was detained "physically and 
psychologically", the standard of review on appeal 
required deference to the trial judge's finding in 
this respect. On the s.8 issue, she concluded that 
the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his luggage and the odours emanating from it and, 
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• Whether the trial judge applied the correct test 
to the issue of reasonable and probable grounds; 
and
• Whether the trial judge erred in convicting the 
accused of impaired driving causing death based 
on an erroneous interpretation of impairment of 
the ability to drive.
Dog Sniff
R. v. A. M. (Ontario Court of Appeal—by Leave)
The police accepted a long-standing invitation to 
bring sniffer dogs into the accused’s high school to 
search for drugs. The police had no knowledge that 
drugs were present in the school and would not have 
been able to obtain a warrant to search the school. 
The sniffer dog was trained to detect marihuana, 
hashish, cocaine, heroin and crack cocaine. The 
police searched the whole school while the students 
were confined to their classrooms. In a gymnasium, 
they found a pile of backpacks but no students. The 
sniffer dog reacted to the accused’s backpack. 
Without obtaining a warrant, the police opened the 
backpack and found marihuana and magic mushrooms. 
The accused was charged with possession of 
cannabis marihuana and psilocybin for the purpose of 
trafficking. At trial, he challenged the admissibility 
of the evidence. The drugs were subsequently 
excluded and the charges against the accused were 
dismissed. A unanimous Ontario Court of Appeal 
upheld the trial judge's ruling. 
Questions for the Supreme Court of Canada include:
 
• Whether the accused’s rights under s. 8 of the 
Charter were breached; and
• Whether evidence was properly excluded at the 
accused’s trial for possession of drugs for the 
purposes of trafficking.
Right to Silence
R. v. Singh (British Columbia) (By Leave)
An innocent bystander was standing just inside the 
doorway of a pub when a group of people were 
arguing outside the pub and a stray bullet shot by 
someone in the group struck the bystander, killing 
him. The accused was arrested and charged with 
second degree murder. During the second of two 
police interviews following his arrest, the accused 
therefore, the dog sniff was an unreasonable search 
within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter.
Questions for the Supreme Court of Canada include: 
• Whether the police dog sniffing the accused’s 
backpack violated his right under s. 8 of the 
Charter to be secure against unreasonable search 
or seizure;
• Whether the trial judge erred by failing to find 
that the accused was subject to an unreasonable 
search and seizure and the evidence ought to 
have been excluded from trial pursuant to s. 
24(2) of the Charter; and
• Whether Justice Paperny in dissent was correct 
that a search occurred—that the accused had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Reasonable Grounds
R. v. Rhyason (Alberta Court of Appeal—as of Right)
The accused conceded that the car he was driving 
struck and killed a 17-year-old pedestrian who was 
crossing the street at a marked, lit crosswalk at a 
controlled intersection. He had been drinking. The 
arresting officer detected an odour of alcohol on 
the accused’s breath and demanded a breath sample 
even though he showed no balance or slurring 
problems. The officer testified: "Well, my 
observations impaired, or excuse me, of alcohol 
consumption indicia, as well as my belief that the 
victim was deceased, and based on the fact that he 
had stated he was the driver....I formed the opinion 
that [the accused] had consumed alcohol in such a 
quantity that impaired his ability to operate a motor 
vehicle, and subsequently caused the death of—of 
the victim." The breath samples showed the accused 
had more than the legal limit of 80mg%. 
The trial judge found him guilty of operating a motor 
vehicle while having more than 80mg%. The trial 
judge also found that his impairment contributed 
more than de minimis to cause the accident. The 
majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed 
the appeal. Justice Slatter dissented, would have 
allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the 
basis that the trial judge did not apply the correct 
legal test in deciding whether there were reasonable 
and probable grounds for the breath sample. 
Questions for the Supreme Court of Canada include:
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away car and a few minutes after the break and 
enter, the police stopped a vehicle matching the 
description. Four individuals, including the accused, 
were inside the vehicle. The police found a loaded 
pistol in the vehicle. 
The trial judge held it was a reasonable inference 
that the occupants of the vehicle were the intruders 
and that they had the gun with them during the 
break and enter. The accused was convicted of 
multiple offences, including use of a firearm while 
committing an indictable offence, for which he was 
sentenced to a one-year jail term to be served 
consecutively to all other sentences. The Crown 
conceded on the appeal that it also was a reasonable 
inference that the gun might have been in the get-
away vehicle during the break and enter. Section 
85(1)(a) of the Criminal Code states that "Every 
person commits an offence who uses a firearm while 
committing an indictable offence ...". The British 
Columbia Court of Appeal held "uses a firearm" 
includes having a firearm "proximate for future use". 
Questions for the Supreme Court of Canada include: 
• Whether accused should have been convicted of 
use of a firearm while committing break and 
enter of a dwelling house if firearm was located 
in vehicle outside dwelling house; and 
• Whether "use of a firearm" includes a situation 
in which a firearm is "proximate for future use".
Source: Supreme Court of Canada www.scc-csc.gc.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Search Incident to Arrest
“It appears to me that the police officers 
could have obtained a search warrant 
and had time to do so.  But there is no 
requirement in law that a search warrant 
be obtained if the search is conducted 
incidentally to the lawful arrest of the suspect for any of 
three reasons:  to ensure the safety of the police and the 
public; to protect evidence from destruction; or...for “the 
discovery of evidence which can be used at the arrestee’s 
trial.” - British Columbia Court of Appeal, R.. v. Munro, 
2005 BCCA 610
made admissions to the police which the Crown 
sought to introduce into evidence at trial in order to 
identify him as the shooter. He was given proper 
Charter warnings and spoke to counsel before the 
interviews. During the interviews, he repeatedly 
asserted his right to silence. He repeatedly told the 
police that he did not want to talk, that he had 
nothing to say, that he knew nothing about the 
shooting, and that he wanted to return to his cell. 
Each time the accused raised his right to silence, 
the interviewing officer said that he had a duty or 
desire to place the evidence before the accused and 
he continued the interview. The trial judge admitted 
the statements into evidence, holding that the police 
did not breach the accused’s right to silence by 
continuing to question him after he had asserted his 
right to silence. The British Columbia Court of 
Appeal upheld the decision to admit the admissions 
into evidence and the accused’s conviction for 
second degree murder.
Questions for the Supreme Court of Canada include: 
• Whether it is a violation of s. 7 of the Charter 
for a police officer to attempt to persuade a 
detained person, who has asserted a right to 
remain silent following the exercise of the right 
to counsel, to break his or her silence; and
• Whether a voluntary statement to police may be 
excluded on the basis that the accused's right to 
silence was violated.
Use of Firearm
R. v. Steele (British Columbia) (By Leave)
A woman saw three intruders in the backyard of a 
neighbour's dwelling house, challenged them and 
frightened them away. The accused’s thumb print 
was found at the scene of an attempted break and 
enter. Ten days later, four individuals broke into the 
same house. They awakened three residents. One 
intruder said "Don't move ... We have a gun ... Where 
are the drugs?" Another said "Where are the drugs? 
... Get the gun ... Get the gun." Another said "Get the 
gun out." The intruders fled. None of the residents 
identified the accused as one of the intruders or 
testified that they saw a gun, although they 
testified that they saw some of the intruders 
holding objects about the size of a gun. The 
residents gave the police a description of the get-
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reasonable, and the manner the search was carried 
out was also reasonable. The Court noted:
In the Mann case, the Supreme Court of Canada 
established that an investigative detention and 
protective search is authorized by law and is 
reasonable in circumstances where carrying out 
proper police duties requires it. The police have 
the responsibility of protecting the 
lives of the public, including their own. 
In 2007 it is obvious that a member 
of the public who, in a public place, 
has a gun, is a potential threat to the 
public. It is clear that the risk can be 
as great from a hidden handgun as 
from a more obvious rifle. [para. 5]
Here, the Court ruled, the trial judge 
did not err in finding the officer was 
fully justified in conducting the 
thorough search of the knapsack 
where marihuana, but no gun, was 
found.  The marihuana was found during a lawful 
protective search and was admissible. Once the 
marihuana was found, the accused was arrested and 
the discovery of more drugs was incidental to the 
arrest. 
Complete case available a www.albertacourts.ab.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Police Questioning & the Right to Counsel
“Whether or not there was detention is of 
fundamental importance, since the right 
of someone to be informed of their right 
to consult counsel arises only if that 
person is being detained… Care must be 
taken in not proceeding on the assumption that everyone 
being interviewed about the commission of a crime is 
detained on the premise that they might eventually become 
a suspect and thus entitled under section  10(b) of the 
Canadian Charter to the right to counsel. ... [N]ot every 
contact between a citizen, even one who is a suspect, and 
the police, creates in and of itself a situation of fact 
amounting to detention, with the rights that flow from that 
status.” -  Quebec Court of Appeal, R. v. Gaudette, 2006 
QCCA 1004
THOROUGH KNAPSACK SEARCH 
JUSTIFIED INCIDENT TO 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
R. v. Peters, 2007 ABCA 181
Three bike patrol officers responded 
to a call from a hotel that a man 
wearing a red jacket 
and carrying a 
knapsack with pins and trinkets 
inside the hotel had a gun. Upon 
arrival the officers saw the 
accused fitting the description. 
No gun was seen but he was 
wearing a red/orange jacket and 
had a large knapsack with pins and 
trinkets on it. One of the officers 
patted down the accused and 
searched the knapsack by opening 
it up and taking a quick look, making sure nothing was 
obvious. A second officer was not satisfied with the 
cursory search and felt a small gun or weapon hidden 
in the knapsack could pose a threat. He did not want 
to return the knapsack to the accused which might 
have contained a firearm. The officer then made a 
more thorough search of the knapsack and found 
baggies containing marihuana, walkie-talkies, pipes, 
lighters, and a bottle of isopropyl at the bottom. 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
accused was convicted of possessing marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking. The trial judge ruled 
that there were reasonable grounds for the 
investigative detention and protective search, which 
was reasonable in manner and scope. The accused 
then appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal. He 
did not challenge the validity of the initial detention, 
the pat-down or the cursory search of the upper 
part of the knapsack, but argued, in part, that the 
extended detention and deeper search into the 
knapsack by the second officer breached his s.8 
Charter rights. 
In a memorandum of judgment, the Alberta Court of 
Appeal upheld the conviction. Since there was no 
warrant for the investigative detention or 
protective search the Crown needed to 
demonstrate, on the preponderance of the evidence, 
the search was authorized by law, the law was 
“[A]n investigative detention 
and protective search is 
authorized by law and is 
reasonable in circumstances 
where carrying out proper 
police duties requires it. The 
police have the responsibility 
of protecting the lives of the 
public, including their own.”
www.10-8.ca
www.10-8.ca
21
Volume 7 Issue 3
May/June 2007
ROAD RULES:
Bicycle Safety Helmets
Section 184 of BC’s Motor Vehicle Act 
creates two offences related to bicycle 
safety helmets. First, under s.184(1) it is an 
offence for a person to operate or ride as 
a passenger on a cycle on a highway 
when not wearing an approved bicycle 
safety helmet. Second, under s.184(2) a parent or guardian 
of a child under 16 years old commits an offence if they 
authorize or knowingly permit the child to operate or ride 
a cycle on a highway without wearing an approved bicycle 
safety helmet.
A “cycle” is defined in s.119 as “a device having any 
number of wheels that is propelled by human power and 
on which a person may ride and includes a motor assisted 
cycle, but does not include a skate board, roller skates or 
in-line roller skates.” Approved safety helmet standards and 
specifications are listed in s.1(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act’s 
Bicycle Safety Helmet Standard Regulation and include 
Canadian Standards Association (CSA), Snell Memorial 
Foundation, American Society for Testing and Materials 
(ASTM), and American National Standards Institute (ANSI). 
Regardless of what standard the helmet is manufactured 
under, all helmets must:
• have a smooth outer surface;
• be constructed so the helmet is capable of absorbing 
energy on impact;
• be strongly attached to a strap designed to be 
fastened under the chin; and
• be undamaged from use or misuse.
Section 2 of the Bicycle Safety Helmet Exemption 
Regulation requires that the safety helmet must have a 
label showing it meets one of the required standards.
Exemptions
Under s.3 of the Bicycle Safety Helmet Exemption 
Regulation four categories of persons are exempt from 
wearing a bicycle safety helmet: (1) the wearing of a helmet 
would interfere with an essential religious practice, (2) 
operators and passengers of pedicabs or quadricycles, (3) 
a person issued a certificate by the Superintendent of 
Motor Vehicles for medical purposes; and (4) a person 
under 12 years old operating a non-chain driven 3 or 4 
wheeled cycle designed for recreational use. 
17th Annual
Abbotsford Police 
Challenge Run
Saturday September 22, 2007
Register Early and Save!
The Abbotsford Police Challenge is committed to 
being a family oriented event and for those who 
don’t run there is a 5 km fun run/walk route so no one 
is excluded from participating. The Police Challenge 
Run began as a Fund Raiser for the Law Enforcement 
Torch Run for Special Olympics 16 years ago. Today 
it has grown to be one of the more prominent 
community events supporting three charities. 
LOCATION
Abbotsford Civic Plaza, adjacent to Abbotsford 
Police Department, 2838 Justice Way, Abbotsford, 
BC.
RACE TIME
Both events start at 9:00 am. Warm-up led by Apollo 
Athletic Club at 8:30 am,  Civic Plaza.
ROUTE
The 10km route is a test of your endurance that 
includes a 1 km hill while the 5km fun run route is a 
single flat loop.
www.abbotsfordpolice.org
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COURTS SHOULD AVOID 
SECOND GUESSING OFFICER 
SAFETY
R. v. White, 2007 ONCA 318
Two plainclothes officers were on 
patrol in an area notorious for criminal 
activity, including gun and drug-
related crimes, when they saw the 
accused driving a black Acura  at about 6 pm. He 
pulled up to a parking spot close to the front door of 
a strip club and remained parked there while his 
girlfriend made three separate trips back and forth 
from the car to the club in the space of six minutes. 
After the third trip, the accused’s girlfriend re-
entered the club and remained inside. Based on their 
experience, the officers believed they had just 
observed a “text-book” case of someone either 
buying or selling drugs and formed the suspicion 
that the accused was engaged in illicit drug activity. 
The officers followed the accused in their van as he 
left the strip club and drove to a nearby gas station. 
At the gas station the officers ran a check on the 
Acura’s licence plate and learned it was registered 
to a man prohibited from driving. Once he paid for 
his gas, the accused did not return directly to his 
car but took a circuitous route that enabled him to 
pass the officers’ van and look inside. They believed 
that this conduct was deliberate and designed to 
confirm his suspicion that he was being followed by 
the police. After walking past the officers’ van, the 
accused returned to his car but he did not leave the 
gas station. He instead went to a Tim Horton’s 
“drive-through” and then returned to the gas 
station parking lot where he parked his car. He got 
out of his car and began to walk away from the 
officers towards the street. He was speaking on his 
cell phone at the time.
Believing that the accused might try to get away, 
the officers decided to stop and investigate him for 
suspected drug activity and driving while prohibited. 
They got out of their van and an officer approached 
the accused, overhearing him say “Yeah, they’re 
here now” on his cell phone. The officer immediately 
identified himself as a police officer and seized the 
accused’s cell phone.   It was then learned the 
accused’s brother was the owner of the car. When 
asked to retrieve his driver’s licence from the car, 
the accused opened the driver’s door and leaned 
across the front seat. He opened the glove 
compartment with his left hand while putting his 
right hand under the passenger seat. This action 
concerned the officers and they put their hands on 
their guns. A “mickey” bottle of liquor was seen 
between the driver and the passenger seat and 
police told the accused he would be charged under 
the Liquor Licence Act and searched. The accused 
replied that if he was going to be searched, he had 
“this” and pulled out two bags of marijuana from his 
pocket, turning them over to an officer. He was 
arrested for possession of a controlled substance 
and advised of his right to counsel.
The car was searched and a loaded .38 calibre 
revolver wrapped in a bandana was found under the 
front passenger seat. The “mickey” bottle of alcohol 
and an electric pocket scale located inside the car 
was also seized along with $80 Canadian and $30 
U.S. from the accused at the police station.
During a voir dire in the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice the officer testified he seized the cell 
phone for reasons of safety and evidence 
preservation. The officer suspected the accused 
was letting others know where he was and what was 
going on and that it could present an officer safety 
issue if other people attended the scene to assist 
the accused, or items such as weapons or evidence 
could be transferred. The trial judge ruled, in part, 
that the police violated the accused’s s.8 Charter 
rights when they seized his cell-phone during the 
investigative detention. She stated:
I find there were no exigent circumstances justifying 
a warrantless seizure under Section 11(7) of The 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. There was no 
urgency to seize the cell phone, nor was there any 
credible evidence of a threat or apprehension that 
the safety of the officers was at risk because [the 
accused] had a cell phone on his person. [The accused] 
was totally compliant and responsive to the officer’s 
detention. He made no threatening gestures with his 
phone or otherwise. He did not attempt to run, he 
showed no inclination towards violence. The officer, 
on his own evidence, perceived no real danger or 
discomfort in the process until later when the 
accused put his hand on the floor of the vehicle. The 
phone call he was on ended when the officer stopped 
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him. There is no evidence he tried to use the phone 
after he was detained.
In her opinion the s.8 violation was serious, police 
conduct “high-handed and an abuse of [their] 
ancillary powers,” and the evidence was excluded 
under s.24(2). The accused was acquitted on charges 
of possessing marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking, possession of property obtained by 
crime, possession of a prohibited firearm, 
possession of prohibited ammunition, and being an 
occupant of a motor vehicle knowing there was a 
firearm.
The Crown appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing the trial judge erred in holding the police 
violated the accused’s rights under s.8 of the 
Charter when they seized his cell phone. Justice 
Moldaver writing the unanimous opinion of the Court, 
however, found the police did not violate the 
accused’s s.8 Charter right. He wrote:
Had the trial judge applied the correct principles of 
law to those findings, she would, in my respectful 
view, have concluded that [the officer] was fully 
justified in seizing the [accused’s] cell phone when he 
did and that he did not violate the respondent’s s. 8 
rights in the process. The critical facts to which I 
refer are set out below:
• On the evening in question, [the 
officers] were working in plain 
clothes in a high risk area of 
Brampton notorious for all manner 
of criminal activity, including drug 
and gun related crimes. Their 
observation of the [accused] and 
his girlfriend at the Cannonball 
Strip Club provided them with 
reasonable grounds to suspect 
that the [accused] was engaged in 
illegal drug activity.
• After they followed the [accused] 
for about a block to a nearby gas 
station, the officers observed him 
taking steps that caused them to 
believe that he suspected he was being followed by 
the police. By this time, the officers had reason to 
suspect that the [accused] was not only engaged in 
illegal drug activity but also, that he was driving 
while prohibited. Their beliefs were legitimate and 
honestly held, and they provided the officers with 
two separate bases for detaining and investigating 
the [accused].
• When the officers decided to approach the 
[accused], he was walking away from their vehicle 
towards the street and he was using his cell phone. 
As [the officer] approached and identified himself 
as a police officer, he overheard the [accused] say 
“Yeah, they’re here now”. It was then that he 
seized the [accused’s] phone.
…[T]he trial judge determined that [the officer] was 
not legally justified in seizing the [accused’s] cell 
phone when he did. In so concluding, she found, among 
other things, that there were “no exigent 
circumstances justifying a warrantless seizure” and 
there “was no urgency to seize the cell phone”.  If by 
that, the trial judge intended to limit the right of 
seizure to situations of immediate danger as opposed 
to reasonably apprehended potential danger, I am 
respectfully of the view that she erred. Put simply, 
the police did not have to wait to seize the [accused’s] 
cell phone until they were set upon by back-up forces 
summonsed by him. They were entitled to take 
preventative measures. 
The trial judge continued her analysis noting that 
there was no “credible evidence of a threat or 
apprehension that the safety of the officers was at 
risk because [the respondent] had a cell phone on his 
person”.
With respect, that 
misses the point. [the 
officer] did not seize 
the [accused’s] cell 
phone simply because he 
“had [it] on his person”. 
He did so because the 
[accused] was letting 
someone know that the 
police were there. That 
is precisely the kind of 
information that [the 
officer] was worried 
about, both from the 
point of view of officer 
safety and the potential 
loss of evidence. If the 
[accused] had not already done so, [the officer] did 
not want to give him the opportunity to provide his 
cohorts with more information, such as the location of 
the gas station and the number of officers present. 
Nor was he required to do so. If ever there was a case 
where [the officer] was justified in seizing the phone 
to prevent (or attempt to prevent) back-up forces, 
“In the circumstances, [the officer] had little 
time to reflect.  He had to make a split 
second decision; a moment’s hesitation 
could have put his life and that of his 
partner in peril. Courts should keep this in 
mind when assessing the conduct of 
officers in the field. When it comes to 
officer safety and preserving the integrity 
of their investigation, police officers should 
be given a good deal of leeway and 
second guessing should be avoided.”
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sympathetic to the [accused], from arriving at the 
scene and imperilling police safety and/or obstructing 
their investigation, this was it. [paras. 44-47]
And further:
In sum…I have no doubt that [the officer] was fully 
justified in seizing the [accused’s] phone when he 
did, for the reasons he gave. There was no s. 8 
breach here. [The officer] was engaged in a high 
risk investigation. He and his partner were in plain 
clothes, in an area of town notorious for drug and 
gun related crimes. They were investigating a 
suspected drug dealer who knew that he was being 
followed by the police and who was “caught in the 
act” conveying information to someone as [the 
officer] approached him.
When [the officer] seized the [accused’s] cell 
phone, he found himself in a dangerous and 
potentially volatile situation. In the circumstances, 
he had little time to reflect.  He had to make a split 
second decision; a moment’s hesitation could have 
put his life and that of his partner in peril. Courts 
should keep this in mind when assessing the conduct 
of officers in the field. When it comes to officer 
safety and preserving the integrity of their 
investigation, police officers should be given a good 
deal of leeway and second guessing should be 
avoided. [paras. 53-54]
The marihuana, loaded firearm, and ammunition were 
admissible as evidence. The Crown’s appeal was 
allowed, the acquittals set aside, and a new trial was 
ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
   ‘IN SERVICE’ 
LEGAL ROAD TEST ANSWERS
1. (a) True—see R. v. Alkins (at p. 4 of this 
publication). 
2. (b) False—see R. v. Rodney (at p. 7 of this 
publication). 
3. (a) True—see R. v. Shankar (at p. 7 of this 
publication). 
4. (a) True—see R. v. Lewis (at p. 9 of this 
publication). 
5. (b) False—see R. v. Duong  (at p. 10 of this 
publication). 
USE OF POLICE TAC UNIT NOT 
EXCESSIVE IN CIRUMSTANCES
Webster v. Edmonton (City) Police Service, 
2007 ABCA 23
Police received a call from the 
complainant about her father, the 
plaintiff, and made a number of 
allegations. She alleged the plaintiff 
was threatening to find her husband with a crew of 
men and inflict serious bodily harm upon him. He had 
access to numerous firearms, including shotguns, .22 
calibre rifles and big long guns, many of which were 
illegal. He was under psychiatric care and suffered 
from depression, anxiety attacks and manic 
depressive episodes. He was unstable, had a wicked 
temper, had an unpredictable nature, and his 
response to police was uncertain, therefore police 
should exercise caution when approaching him.
The call taker, in addition to entering the 
information on the computer, also spoke with the 
supervisor in charge of the communications section. 
The communications supervisor made direct contact 
with the complainant to get more information and to 
corroborate her report. She also directed computer 
searches to determine whether the police had any 
prior involvement at the plaintiff’s residence and 
whether he or his wife had prior criminal histories. 
This resulted in information being provided which 
disclosed that the plaintiff had a prior criminal 
history involving the use of offensive weapons.
The communications supervisor communicated 
directly with a platoon commander who had assumed 
responsibility for the investigation. He determined 
that, in light of the nature of the call, it was 
necessary to involve the police tactical unit in 
accordance with written policy. The tactical unit was 
a team specially trained to deal with firearm calls 
and provide enhanced public safety as well as 
member safety. Rather than storm the house, the 
tactical squad created a security perimeter, 
telephoned the house, and persuaded the plaintiff 
and his wife to come out and surrender with their 
hands in the air. The plaintiff was made to kneel 
down to be handcuffed and the police searched the 
residence and found a number of firearms, stored 
improperly in some respects. Those firearms were 
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seized and disposed of by police arrangement with 
the plaintiff and he was not charged with any 
offence in connection with the firearms. Webster 
was taken to a nearby community police station, his 
handcuffs were removed, and he remained for about 
one hour before his release. Webster’s wife was not 
handcuffed but also driven to the nearby community 
station.
At a civil trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
Webster and his wife sued police, among others, for 
wrongful arrest and detention and claimed damages 
for nervous shock, assault and damage to their 
house. The trial judge found the police, including the 
Chief and the platoon commander, used excessive 
force. Additionally, even if the use of the tactical 
team was initially justified the police were also liable 
in tort because the plaintiff’s detention was 
unlawful. He said:
I conclude that in all the circumstances of this 
case, the use of the tac team was not justified and 
constituted a significantly greater use of force 
than was necessary. Within the principles in the 
Mann decision, the [plaintiffs’] right to security 
within their home was seriously breached. There 
was insufficient evidence of 
danger to [the plaintiff], 
the public or the police to 
justify the steps taken. 
However, even if the use of 
the tac team might have 
been justified initially, I am 
satisfied that the 
detention of the [the 
plaintiffs] was not.
When the [the plaintiffs] 
left their home, with their 
hands empty and raised, it 
was immediately evident 
that they were not a threat 
to anyone. Nevertheless, 
the police methodically continued along with the 
standard procedure of the police manual. They 
considered that a search for the firearms was 
mandatory and that it was necessary that the 
[plaintiffs] be absent from the premises while 
this was conducted. In addition, the search was 
left to the tac team who adopted the approach 
that another dangerous individual could well be 
lurking in the house. This was carried on in the 
face of information from [the complainant] that 
nobody but her parents and a small dog were in the 
house and confirmation from [the plaintiff’s wife] 
that nobody but she and her husband were there.
[The plaintiff] was treated like a dangerous 
criminal by being forced to his knees and 
handcuffed while [his wife] was placed in a police 
car. They were each taken away in view of 
bystanders and a TV film crew. In the 
circumstances, the police could have readily 
located the weapons through directions 
voluntarily given by both parties and returned the 
[the plaintiffs] to their home in short order. 
Unfortunately, [the platoon commander], who was 
in charge, never saw the [the plaintiffs] leave 
their home and nobody appears to have had the 
authority or the inclination to exercise any 
independent judgment on the scene. The 
procedure adopted was inexorable and incapable 
of any flexibility. I find that it was not justified 
and resulted in the unlawful detention of the 
[plaintiffs].
The plaintiff was awarded $6,000 in damages while 
his wife was awarded $4,000. 
The defendants, including the Chief of police and 
the platoon commander, appealed to trial judge’s 
ruling to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal arguing 
the plaintiff was not 
wrongfully detained or 
that the police used 
excessive force when 
they used the tactical 
team during this 
operation. In a 
Memorandum of 
Judgment the Alberta 
Court of Appeal allowed 
the appeal and dismissed 
the plaintiff’s actions.  
Excessive Force
Police officers will be exempt from liability under 
s.25 of the Criminal Code “if they use no more force 
than is necessary having regard to their reasonably 
held assessment of the circumstances and dangers 
in which they find themselves.” In citing a previous 
judgment (Crampton v. Walton, 2005 ABCA 81), the 
principles surrounding police use of force were 
summarized as follows:
“Police officers are not expected to measure 
the precise amount of force the situation 
requires. Nor will they be denied the 
protection of s. 25(1) if they fail to use the 
least amount of force that would achieve the 
desired result. Allowance must be made for 
an officer, in the exigency of the moment, 
misjudging the degree of necessary force. 
Accordingly, the immediate decisions a police 
officer makes in the course of duty are not 
assessed through the ‘lens of hindsight’”
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Police officers are not expected to measure the 
precise amount of force the situation 
requires...Nor will they be denied the protection 
of s. 25(1) if they fail to use the least amount of 
force that would achieve the desired result. 
Allowance must be made for an officer, in the 
exigency of the moment, misjudging the degree of 
necessary force…Accordingly, the immediate 
decisions a police officer makes in the course of 
duty are not assessed through the "lens of 
hindsight"…[references omitted] 
In this case the trial judge made three palpable and 
overriding errors. First, his conclusion was 
inappropriately based, in part, on hindsight. Second, 
he was misguided in concluding that the police ought 
to have obtained more information before employing 
the tactical team. For example, it was unlikely that 
the plaintiff’s counselling psychologist would have 
agreed to provide information without his consent. 
And finally, the trial judge neglected to consider 
that “the police need not measure the precise 
amount of force required and must be given 
allowance for misjudging the degree of force 
required because of the exigency of the moment. As 
well, he neglected to consider whether their 
assessment of the circumstances and danger was 
reasonably held.” The Court stated:
If the trial judge had not made the above errors, 
he would have been unable to conclude that the use 
of the tactical team constituted excessive force. 
The police assessment of the circumstances was 
reasonably held and in good faith. They had a 
report suggesting that the respondent had made 
threats against [the complainant’s] husband; had a 
criminal record; was under psychiatric care and 
was unpredictable; and was in possession of 
numerous firearms including illegal ones. 
Deployment of the tactical team under these 
circumstances was required by the Police 
Service's Policy…
Given the need for public protection in the 
circumstances known to the police, the use of the 
tactical team did not constitute excessive force.  
[paras. 32-33]
The Detention
The Supreme Court of Canada outlined in R. v. Mann
the circumstances in which a person may be detained 
for investigative detention:
The detention must be viewed as reasonably 
necessary on an objective view of the totality of 
the circumstances, informing the officer's 
suspicion that there is a clear nexus between the 
individual to be detained and a recent or on-going 
criminal offence. Reasonable grounds figures at 
the front-end of such an assessment, underlying 
the officer's reasonable suspicion that the 
particular individual is implicated in the criminal 
activity under investigation. The overall 
reasonableness of the decision to detain, however, 
must further be assessed against all of the 
circumstances, most notably the extent to which 
the interference with individual liberty is 
necessary to perform the officer's duty, the 
liberty interfered with, and the nature and extent 
of that interference, in order to meet the second 
prong of the Waterfield test.
In this case, the trial judge misapplied the Mann 
principles. The Court stated:
His conclusion on improper detention was 
apparently based on his view that [Webster] and 
his wife were not a threat because they came out 
of the house with their hands up; the police could 
have searched the house while [Webster] and his 
wife remained in it; [Webster] was forced to 
kneel while he was handcuffed; and a TV film crew 
and others observed all this.
On the one hand, the trial judge failed to take 
account of "all the circumstances", as required by 
Mann. On the other, he took account of 
circumstances that were irrelevant or beyond the 
control of the police.
Among the circumstances he neglected to 
consider were whether it was realistic to expect 
the police to conduct a weapons search while 
[Webster] was in the house and, if not, whether it 
was realistic to keep [him] standing outside the 
house given the cold temperature that day. He 
also failed to consider whether [Webster’s] 
privacy interests would be better served if he was 
taken to the police station rather than left in the 
glare of publicity.
As for circumstances that he considered, the 
presence of the media and others was not within 
the control of the police. This was an irrelevant 
consideration in his assessment of the overall 
circumstances.
A proper application of Mann compels the 
conclusion that the detention was not improper. 
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There was a clear nexus between the [Webster’s] 
detention and the officers’ reasonable belief that 
[Webster] was implicated in the criminal activity 
under investigation (threats and possession of 
illegal guns). It was not unreasonable for the 
police to conclude that [Webster] should be 
absent from the house during the weapons search. 
The matrix of the circumstances included the 
weather, the presence of curious onlookers on the 
one hand, and the relatively short time during 
which the respondent was detained. These 
circumstances also supported the reasonableness 
of the police action. [paras. 37-41]
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
CRIMINAL CODE DISTURBANCE 
REQUIRES MORE THAN 
ATTRACTING CURIOSITY
R. v. Walker, 2007 ONCA 
At about 6:00 pm the accused, a 
uniformed patrol officer, was 
patrolling in a marked police car when 
he saw the complainant walking. The 
officer thought the complainant might be a person 
wanted on an arrest warrant. As the officer 
attempted to make eye contact, the  complainant 
glanced over at him and then quickly looked away. 
The officer decided to speak to him and also had 
concerns, arising from the clothing that the 
complainant was wearing, that he might be a gang 
member.
The officer made a U-turn and pulled his police car 
partially up onto the grassy curb area beside the 
sidewalk. The complainant was a short distance 
ahead of the officer but, after the police car pulled 
up onto the curb area, the complainant stopped, 
turned around and walked back to the police car. The 
officer spoke to the complainant who responded in a 
loud voice. Upon observing the complainant's face at 
close range, the officer realized that he was not the 
man wanted on a warrant.
The complainant continued to "vent" at the officer, 
including the use of insulting language, consisting of 
accusations of racism. The complainant also asserted 
that the officer was only questioning him because he 
was a black male. The officer got out of his police 
car and asked the complainant to identify himself, 
but the complainant continued to make comments in 
a loud voice to the officer. The officer attempted to 
contact the police dispatcher by his radio but the 
battery fell out of the unit rendering it inoperable. 
The complainant told the officer again that he was a 
racist and suggested that the officer arrest him.
Some residents of the area came out of their houses 
to see what was going on. The officer told the 
complainant that he was under arrest for causing a 
disturbance and told him to turn around so that he 
could be handcuffed. The officer got the handcuffs 
on one of the complainant's wrists but the 
complainant then began to resist. The officer 
delivered a knee strike to the complainant and 
forced him to the ground, causing his cheek bone to 
fracture. Once the complainant was on the ground, 
the officer completed handcuffing him. The officer 
placed the battery back into his radio and called for 
backup and other officers arrived on scene to assist.
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the officer 
was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and 
given a conditional discharge. The trial judge 
concluded that the officer left his police car to 
pursue an investigation into whether the complainant 
was a gang member which resulted in a detention. 
She found the detention unlawful. At the time the 
officer left his car he knew the complainant was not 
the man wanted on a warrant and further, the 
officer had no reason to believe the complainant was 
involved in or had any knowledge of any criminal 
offence. The trial judge also ruled the officer was 
not acting in the lawful execution of his duties when 
he made the arrest. The disturbance that occurred 
resulted from the officer unlawfully detaining the 
complainant and therefore the arrest for causing a 
disturbance was unlawful. There was no justification 
to use force and the Crown had proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the officer had assaulted the 
complainant and caused bodily harm.
The officer then appealed to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice alleging the trial judge erred in 
finding a detention. Had he found no detention, the 
officer said the trial judge would not have concluded 
the arrest was unlawful. The Crown submitted that 
the issue of detention was irrelevant because there 
was no disturbance and therefore no basis upon 
which the officer could have arrested the 
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complainant. Rather, the officer created the 
disturbance by persisting in unjustifiably questioning 
the complainant. 
The appeal judge ruled that is was open to the trial 
judge to find a detention and even so, there was no 
disturbance as defined by the case law. There was 
no “externally manifested disturbance” even though 
certain people in the area had their attention drawn 
to the encounter. Merely attracting curiosity is not 
the same as causing a disturbance. Further, any 
degree of disturbance was instigated by the officer. 
The appeal judge stated:
The trial judge pointed out that the [officer], 
once he knew that the complainant was not the man 
he was seeking and that the complainant was 
objecting to being questioned, could simply have 
driven off. Instead, the officer got out of his 
police car, thereby exacerbating the situation, and 
persisted in questioning the complainant when he 
had no reasonable grounds to do so. While counsel 
for the [officer] contended that the [officer] had 
the right to ask questions because of the 
complainant's "bizarre" conduct, the fact is that 
there was no evidence of such conduct nor was 
there any evidence to base any reasonable belief 
that the complainant might have been mentally ill 
or intoxicated and therefore a danger to the 
public peace.
I do not quarrel in any way with the point made by 
counsel for the [officer] that police officers 
ought not to be subject, in the course of their 
duties, to verbal abuse or insults at the hands of 
citizens. At the same time, however, citizens have 
the right to object to the actions of the police 
where they have a reasonable basis to believe that 
an officer may be exceeding his or her authority. 
This is particularly important in the context of 
investigative detentions for the reason that Mr. 
Justice lacobucci set out in R. v. Mann...where, in 
discussing some of the dangers associated with 
such detentions, he noted... " ... the potential for 
abuse inherent in such low-visibility exercises of 
discretionary power ..."
It would have the proverbial "chilling effect" on 
the rights of citizens to object to such abuse by 
police officers if the consequences of objecting 
were to be for the objectors to then find 
themselves charged with a criminal offence such 
as causing a disturbance. In so concluding, I do not 
mean to condone the conduct of the complainant 
regarding the manner in which he chose to express 
his objections. I, like the trial judge, find his use 
of insulting language towards the officer 
disturbing. However, it remains the fact that, 
however objectionable the conduct of the 
complainant may have been, on the facts before 
the trial judge she was entitled to find, as a fact, 
that it did not rise to the level of causing a 
disturbance nor could the [officer] reasonably 
have concluded that it did.
The officer then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal. In dismissing the appeal in a short 
Endorsement, the Court stated:
Even if there was a “disturbance,” in common 
parlance, there was no “disturbance” within the 
meaning of the Criminal Code in this case.  The trial 
judge found that the [officer] had no right to 
continue investigating or questioning the 
complainant.  While the complainant’s loud and rude 
protestations may have been “disturbing” to some, 
they did not constitute reasonable grounds for the 
[officer] whose improper actions instigated the 
exchange to believe there was a criminal 
disturbance. [para. 5]
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
MARK YOUR CALENDAR!!!
POLICE LEADERSHIP 2008 
CONFERENCE
April 14-16, 2008
The British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General, 
and the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia, Police 
Academy are hosting the 
Police Leadership 2008 Conference in Vancouver, 
British Columbia, at the Westin Bayshore. This is 
Canada's largest police leadership conference and 
is held every two years. International speakers 
and participants from across Canada and beyond 
will be attending. More details at:
www.jibc.ca
Future of Police Leadership: 
One World, One Voice, One Purpose
